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Symbols are an important facet of political life and diplomatic strategy for any 
modern state. Performing the role of leader of the People’s Republic of China, Xi 
Jinping clearly recognizes the power of symbolic acts, as well as the need for 
rhetorically updated frameworks, in Chinese diplomacy.1 Xi's characterizations of 
Chinese foreign policy under his leadership are numerous, and each one, if 
implemented with the necessary vigour, could bring about a shift in relations with 
Pyongyang. This chapter will consider Xi’s most significant foreign policy 
framework, the “One Belt, One Road”, and apply it to an examination of 
empirical developments in Sino-North Korean relations.  
 
It is clear that linkages with Pyongyang, both symbolic and practical, have grown 
frayed under Xi’s rule.2 Summit meetings, or their absence, are a common means 
of measuring this phenomenon. Xi  has not met North Korean leader Kim Jong-un 
once during more than four years of Kim’s rule, yet he has seen South Korean 
President Park Geun-hye with some frequency and apparent enthusiasm. We 
should not overplay this; Kim Jong-un’s father and predecessor, Kim Jong-il only 
made his first official visit to China as North Korean leader in 2000, six years 
after taking power following his own father, Kim Il-sung’s death in July 1994. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that Xi’s highest-ranking interlocutors from the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) thus far have been Choe Ryong-
hae and Ri Su-yong, and not the leader himself. Both Choe and Ri are trusted 
confidants of the leader and important officials in their own right, certainly, but 
they are by no means heads of state or in possession of independent authority.3   
 
In the commercial realm, Chinese trade with the DPRK on Xi’s watch has been 
robust by North Korean standards but paltry by Chinese metrics.4 Once again 
looking toward South Korea more frequently than the North, Xi has gone out of 
the way to meet with large groups of powerful South Korean CEOs in Beijing, 
and took a delegation of more than one hundred Chinese business leaders to Seoul 
in 2014.5 This focus is hardly surprising when we consider that, in 2012, US$ 942 
million of Chinese FDI flowed into the Republic of Korea, while US$ 5.4 billion 
of Korean money flowed the other way.6  
 
At the same time, Xi  has left officials in the provinces of Liaoning and Jilin to 
bear the disappointment of disquieting silence from their cross-border North 
Korean counterparts. And bear it they have: Liaoning suffered a considerable 
downturn in the first quarter of 2016, with the gross domestic product of the 
province falling 1.3 percent in the period amidst a noteworthy fall in FAI, or fixed 
asset investment (a 48.7 percent year-on-year decline over the same three months). 
This makes Liaoning an outlier in the Chinese context; all other provinces 
recorded FAI growth. North Korea is of course not the only reason for this drastic 
decline in Liaoning Province’s economic fortunes, but it does highlight the way in 
which stilted relations between the two ostensibly friendly states indubitably acts 
as a negative drag on China’s strategic plan to develop its northeast.7 
 
Simultaneously, China has been maneuvered into the position of voting in favor 
of placing sanctions against North Korea at the United Nations and, as a result, 
has incurred international criticism for its lax enforcement of restrictions along 
the mountainous shared border that divides the two states.8 North Korea's nuclear 
programme has similarly been an area of great contention. Xi warned obliquely 
about North Korea “throwing the region into chaos for selfish gains”, and a 
number of Chinese generals have published open speculation about North Korean 
collapse, the plausibility of Western attacks on the DPRK, and the possibility of 
ecological contamination due to nuclear incidents or accidents.9 
 
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi's formulation of China-DPRK relations as 
being “a normal state-to-state relationship with a deep tradition of friendship” 
encapsulates what China wishes to promote as he ‘new normal’ with North Korea 
under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The relationship between China and North 
Korea had previously rested on unique Party-to-Party foundations, but this is no 
longer so, as seen in the elevation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vis-à-vis the 
CCP International Liaison Department (ILD). The ILD has not been completely 
sidelined in Beijing's ties with the Workers' Party of Korea—China’s 
ambassadors to Pyongyang are all of ILD lineage, and the institution remains an 
important if intermittent interlocutor—but it no longer holds an institutional 
monopoly on cross-border relations.10  
 
Given the prevailing circumstances previously outlined, it behooves us to return 
to the question of Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy framework, “One Belt, 
One Road”, or OBOR. Specifically, it is crucial to examine the extent to which 
OBOR coheres with practical actions toward North Korea on the ground.11 As we 
shall see, the findings of this chapter show genuine discord between the rhetorical 
strategy and the responses of North Korea to that framework. That there is a gap 
between rhetoric and reality can easily be seen from travel to the frontier between 
the two states. It may not be immediately apparent, but it could be that China's 
position in world politics as a global stakeholder is, in the end, entirely 
incompatible with its traditional relationship with Pyongyang.  
 
The first part of this essay employs the OBOR concept in its most conventional 
understanding—infrastructure, inter-cultural relations, and trade beyond national 
frontiers—to assess developments in China-North Korea relations in the era of Xi 
Jinping and, in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-un. The second part examines OBOR in 
terms of linkages between the two ruling parties. 
 
 
Belt one: infrastructure, economics and inter-cultural relations  
 
At the moment of its unveiling in the autumn of 2013, China and Xi Jinping’s 
signature OBOR initiative brought renewed vitality to the analytical table. Inter 
alia, it constituted an opportunity for the practical re-imagining of relations along 
the Yalu and Tumen rivers that form the shared border between North Korea and 
China. At the same time, it provided outside observers with a lever by which to 
peek under the hood at what Sino-North Korea ties are really like behind the 
standard hum of low-intensity propaganda. The resulting view was multifaceted: 
moments of focus, pragmatic with moments of dogma, and primarily forward 
looking but occasionally tangled up in historical wrongs both perceived and real.  
 
Needless to say, economic plans had been on the agenda long before 2013—
indeed, they have been on Beijing’s global agenda for four decades. In the context 
of economic relations with the DPRK, a number of bilateral economic 
developments were launched after a landmark visit to Pyongyang by then-Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao in October 2009, most of which were due to come to fruition 
in the period surrounding Kim Jong-un’s ascent to power in North Korea.12 In 
particular, Chinese capital and engineering know-how combined with North 
Korean labor on the construction of a huge, and hugely symbolic, bridge across 
the Yalu River to the west of the old downtown core of Dandong and Sinuiju, 
now clearly visible from many places in the North Korean border city. North 
Korea also set about constructing a paved road all the way from Sinuiju south to 
where it was originally intended to culminate, the juncture of the Pyongyang-
Huichon Highway and existing National Road No. 1 meet north of Anju. A 
second agreement was reportedly signed that would (in theory, at least) result in 
the construction of a high-speed rail link between Beijing and Kaesong via 
Pyongyang, although this appears somewhat closer to speculation than reality.13  
 
With English- and (South) Korean-language media attention diverted in the 
direction of Kim Jong-un’s absence from the public eye in September and 
October 2014, China and North Korea remained as open for business as they had 
ever been.14 Provincial officials in Liaoning expressed excitement over a new 
tourist route to the DPRK’s Tongnim County, and a handful of small new tourist 
ventures opened in the Tumen River valley. The Third Annual Sino-North Korean 
Trade Fair also went ahead as planned from 16-20 October 2014 in Dandong.15 
As one of the authors noted at the time: 
 
Last year’s fair can be counted as a success […] a big opening gala in 
Dandong included a performance by the Mansudae Arts Troupe, which 
was a sure signal (if an indirect one), that Kim Jong-un approved of the 
bilateral fair and attached importance to it. This year, the Samjiyeon 
Ensemble of the Mansudae Arts Troupe seems the most likely group to 
represent North Korea’s large performing arts sector. Speaking from the 
standpoint of Party culture in both DPRK and PRC, Kim Jong-un could 
make a strong statement about his desire to improve relations with China 
by attending a test concert of the Arts Troupe ensemble before it goes to 
Dandong (as he did before the Unhasu Orchestra went to France), but 
given recent events, this seems highly unlikely. A small arts troupe from 
Dalian travelled to North Korea earlier this year, but cultural exchanges 
between the two countries are down significantly from their 2010-2011 
high. Apart from getting a large North Korean ensemble onto Chinese soil, 
the main achievement of the fair in culture will probably be to sell yet 
more North Korean landscape and nature paintings to Chinese collectors.16 
 
China was seemingly not keen to be deterred by stuttering relations in the lee of 
the execution of a senior North Korean official, Jang Song-taek, shortly after the 
revealing of the OBOR framework in December 2013. A few months after the 
trade fair, in May 2015 Ambassador Li Jinjun set about explaining OBOR to a 
delegation of North Korean officials led by Vice-Foreign Minister Ri Gil-song.1 
Few specifics of the discussion subsequently emerged into the public domain.  
 
One of the problems with describing the CCP approach to provincial leadership 
and the role of the provinces in bilateral ties is that North Korean partners are 
both opaque and not entirely reliable. Nevertheless, the clues are out there, and all 
the evidence suggests that by this point bilateral problems had already begun to 
emerge. The trade fair in Dandong, in particular, can only be termed a failure. The 
North Korean side sent a small and low-powered delegation; no individual or 
musical ensemble associated with Kim Jong-un made the trip at all, and the 
ranking of those Sinuiju city and North Pyongan provincial officials in attendance 
was not high.1  Nor did the North Korean delegation get a warm welcome; 
everything they brought into China was put through a security scanner at the train 
station.1 
 
Buttressing this assessment is the fact that in spite of the signing of a number of 
statements on investment interest in Dandong, immediately upon the completion 
of the trade fair, China began to complain openly about North Korea not having 
held up its side of the bargain on the all-important signature piece of 
infrastructure between Dandong and Sinuiju. The bridge on the outskirts of 
Dandong-Sinuiju is now firmly established as a symbol of bilateral relations 
under Xi Jinping—and not (yet, at least) in a positive sense. It is still not in use as 
of early 2016; in fact, satellite imagery clearly shows that on the North Korean 
side, the complete bridge is not even connected to the national road network, and 
a field visit by the authors in April 2016 revealed a lone guard overseeing access 
to the bridge on the Chinese side, where the bottom four floors of a twenty-floor 
building are intended to house Chinese customs authorities.  
 
In one Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times) article on the subject, a Chinese real estate 
investor reports feeling “hopeless” after betting that the North Koreans would 
follow through on work on their side of the bridge. Without this connection to the 
Korean peninsula, the article implies, Dandong’s Xinchengqu (“New City 
District”), which lies at the terminus of the bridge, is doomed to remain 
economically flat, its modern high-rise apartments gathering dust.17 A Chinese 
construction boss perhaps referring to the slowdown brought about by the purge 
of Jang Song-taek in December 2013, noted that “due to all sorts of reasons, the 
original plan for construction was delayed by a year’s time”.18  
 
North Korea’s apparent disinterest in fulfilling this highly symbolic obligation 
contrasts unfavourably with work in the leisure construction sector in 
Pyongyang.19 It is easy to see this as a kind of implicit insult to China. North 
Korea is evidently capable of the construction work required; it has the necessary 
resources when it wishes to use them. Chinese officials can speak at length about 
the benefits to the North Korean consumer economy that would stem from a new 
bridge, and the largesse that would flow into and from a thriving Special 
Economic Zone at Hwanggeumpyeong, but that doesn’t by any means necessarily 
lead to action.20 
 
 
However, it would be wrong to be lulled into thinking relations are at a standstill. 
Business in Dandong utilizing North Korean labour continues; according to South 
Korean scholar Kim Byong-yon, approximately 30 percent of all China-North 
Korea trade is done in Dandong, more than in the entirety of the Yanbian Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture put together, where approximately 20 percent takes place. 
In 2011, a total of 188,306 North Korean citizens legally visited Dandong. 
Employment visa applications are granted readily, at least for people in the 
textiles, food and drink, and IT sectors, as long as the number of North Korean 
employees in a given firm is no greater than 20 percent of the whole.21 
 
Kang Ju-won, a South Korean anthropologist who spent 15 months in Dandong in 
the mid-2000s, characterizes the city as a second Kaesong Industrial Complex, a 
liminal borderland territory where the May 24th Measures, the punitive sanctions 
brought in by the South Korean government following the sinking of a ROK 
Navy vessel by a North Korean torpedo in March 2010, have “no effect.” There 
are an estimated 20,000 North Koreans in the city, he believes, mostly labouring 
in Chinese-run enterprises manufacturing “high-end suits” and other goods for 
export.22 Nevertheless, as the bridge shows, supplying human resources may be 
one thing, but grand projects requiring investments of political as well as financial 
capital are a completely different matter.  
 
North Korean politics is the primary stumbling block toward regional integration. 
However, it is worth noting that like Jilin, its neighbor to northeast, Liaoning 
province acquired a whole new batch of provincial officials in the second half of 
2015. These kinds of changes tend also to restrict productive interactions because 
links have traditionally been maintained along network lines. One of the more 
senior new officials is Bing Zhigang, China’s most senior member of the 
“Management Committee for the Hwanggumpyeong Island Economic Zone with 
DPRK” and the man with oversight over import and export inspections across the 
province, including the port of Dandong. 23 
 
Bing has a rather unique background, in part because he has been anchored in the 
northeast continuously within a Party structure that usually promotes staff through 
cross-regional movement. He is a Liaoning native, born in 1957 near Yingkou. 
Like Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, he came of age during the Cultural Revolution. 
From 1975-78, he worked in the Liaohe oilfields in the director’s office, then he 
worked his way up in the Liaoning province taxation bureau, adding a few Party 
organizations to his credenza, and has been the vice-governor of Liaoning since 
2010. It is unique to carve out an entire career in a single province and avoid 
accusations of corruption in the process. 
 
Bing used to make a habit of meeting with Chinese members of the 
Hwangumpyeong Island SEZ, another joint project between China and the DPRK 
that remains to this day little more than farmland on the outskirts of Dandong’s 
new city district. However, these meetings were rarely if ever attended by North 
Korean counterparts. Whilst waiting for North Korea to reinvigorate the zombie 
Six-Party Talks, we can now also await their return to this committee overseeing 
the (non-)development of the Hwanggeumpyeong zone. 
 
In summary, whilst some of the core infrastructural manifestations of China’s 
“One Belt, One Road” strategy along the North Korean frontier verge on the 
collapsed, China’s resolve to push for them seems to remain, if only to help push 
development in and around Dandong. Seemingly unfazed by the desolation that 
one feels when visiting the Hwanggeumpyeong area, a zone official claimed that 
spring 2016 would bring more action on the ground as additional businesses 
received licenses to trade there. In much the same way, North Korean state 
employees remain publicly bullish about the prospects for Sinuiju and the 
surrounding area. 24 Only time will tell whether there is truth in either claim, but 
as of May-June 2016, direct observation suggests few reasons for hope.  
 
If anything, the Dandong-Sinuiju area has regressed somewhat since Xi  came to 
the helm in Beijing, with cracks in the old colonial bridge over the Yalu acting as 
a potent symbol of faltering attempts to drive economic interactions forward.25 
Amid all the new mock-ups, architectural plans and hype over a trade zone whose 
tax-free rules apply only to Chinese living within 20 km of Dandong, the New 
Yalu River Bridge, arguably the one piece of infrastructure that probably would 
put trade cooperation onto a new level of, as Xi himself would put it, “healthy 
relations”, lies determinedly idle. 
 
This sense of stasis—moving neither forward nor back, building a bridge but not 
opening it, opening a trade fair but barely attending it—does not actually go down 
well in China, where there is an understandable desire to feel as if the relationship 
has changed or that the way it is discussed (the parameters of discourse) have 
changed fundamentally. The same can be said of local North Korean officials, 
who have plans of their own but lack the capital to implement them. However, the 
security services on both sides of the border probably see continuity as the order 
of the day, and are prepared to continue in the present situation indefinitely, even 
though it hurts Liaoning (and likely Jilin) provinces directly. We are witnessing a 
balancing act, wherein Chinese CCP scholars like Zhang Liangui can rage about 
North Korea’s refusal to return to Six-Party Talks or desire to be a nuclear state, 
but the CCP itself does not impose further sanctions and the objection appears to 
be largely rhetorical, if steadfastly so. This equilibrium is carefully managed by 
China, and even in the lee of the January 2016 nuclear test, there is little chance of 
Beijing strangling Pyongyang.26 
 
 
Belt two: party to party linkages and friendship 
 
Symbols matter more than normal when a bilateral relationship is in transition, as 
it has been for China and North Korea for the last four years. There is the need to 
update relations, to put a new face on an old problem, but also to show the outside 
world that things continue on and that the new ruler on either side is in full control 
of events (even if/when he is not). Where a close reading of the economy 
indicates a fractious form of stasis, politically it is important to signal unity. 
 
The two nominally communist parties of China and North Korea attach great 
significance to the symbolism of Sino-DPRK relations. Analysts and netizens 
tend to loudly wring their hands over KWP First Secretary Kim Jong-un’s failure 
to travel to Beijing for an earnest bilateral meeting with CCP General Secretary 
Xi Jinping, but a great deal of symbolic currency is still being simultaneously 
spent—in particular by the Chinese side—to embody how stable the bilateral 
relationship continues to be, irrespective of the lack of direct meetings between 
Kim and Xi.27 Zhou Yongkang’s appearance next to Kim Jong-un at the young 
leader’s debut on the dais in Pyongyang in October 2010 was a case in point of 
such symbolic unity, as was propaganda chief Liu Yunshan’s appearance in the 
same location in October 2015.  
 
Partly as a consequence of its importance, the symbolic rhythm of China’s 
relations with North Korea is bound to feature moments of flux and negativity; in 
truth, far too much ink is spilt and column inches devoted to problematizing 
trivial bilateral quibbles. Nevertheless, even on those occasions when practical 
explanations may lie close at hand, one cannot always avoid the sense that 
something has gone missing since the passing of Kim Jong-il  i  2011. Choe 
Ryong-hae’s placement vis-à-vis Xi Jinping on the dais at Tiananmen Square on 
September 3, 2015 showed the Chinese leader appearing to bestow greater favour 
on South Korean leader Park Geun-hye than China’s traditional northern ally, for 
instance.28 The public humiliation of Jang Song-taek and his abrupt execution—in 
part for selling minerals too cheaply to China, or so argued the court judgment 
against him—in December 2013 was another moment of symbolic distance 
between the two regimes, for Jang had been a close and regular interlocutor with 
more sympathetic ears in Beijing.29  
 
Whereas United States politicians and officials are constantly calling on China to 
be more explicit in its public rebuffs of North Korea, the Chinese news media has 
taken a diametrically oppositional style.30 Trips taken by Wu Dawei, China’s 
special representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, like those of other Chinese 
diplomats, are rarely used by China to declare the efficacy of the PRC’s line of 
diplomacy with North Korea. Diplomats go to Pyongyang to ‘confer’ or ‘consult’ 
with the North Koreans, with whom they ‘exchange views’ and that is the end of 
it. Silence thereafter predominates; angry, triumphant, or mildly cautionary 
opinion-editorials in the People’s Daily rarely accompany visits below the 
Politburo level, and the status quo is concisely maintained. 
 
High-level diplomacy, on the other hand, is played up heavily, and needs to be 
watched rather more carefully for small gestures and verbal cues. The sit-down 
bilateral headed by Kim Jong-un and Liu Yunshan in October 2015 was a case in 
point. At least in the biased reporting of North Korean television, the meeting was 
dominated by the DPRK Supreme Leader, who held forth extemporaneously 
about, it is alleged, traditional friendship.  
 
At the time, Kim received a letter from Xi Jinping in a burgundy folder embossed 
with the universal Communist Party symbol. Given that the letter was handed 
over without it having been checked first, it can be assumed that the document 
was pre-approved. While North Korean media tends to be quite forthcoming 
about strong ties to the DPRK where other nations are concerned, a letter from Xi 
Jinping is interpreted within a careful framework of equality or respect.  
 
On 9 October 2015, Choe Ryong-hae led a bilateral meeting with Liu Yunshan 
and the delegation from Beijing shortly after the latter’s arrival in the North 
Korean capital, prior to Kim Jong-un doing the same, and then played host at a 
reception for the visitors. Choe has been representing the Kim government in its 
diplomatic dealings with China and Russia since at least May 2013.31 
He apparently received what one report called “red carpet treatment” in Beijing in 
early September too, including face time with an unnamed but prominent Chinese 
official during a brief stopover in Shenyang en route.32 Analytic focus on the 
false dichotomy of Park Geun-hye’s comparative prominence on the Beijing 
podium allowed Choe’s practical accomplishments to pass by totally unnoticed, 
but he does seem to have executed his responsibilities to the satisfaction of the 
North Korean side.33 
 
The only marked difference in Pyongyang this time was the clothing; Choe no 
longer has a formal military affiliation, and appeared in the sober business suit of 
a party secretary. This sartorial detail has no impact on his symbolic authority in 
this instance, however.34 His position seated at Kim Jong-un’s left hand for the 
70th anniversary torchlight parade in Pyongyang on the evening of October 10, 
2015 provided a clear demonstration of the status his family line generates, 
especially in dealings with China, of whom Choe’s father was a “de facto member 
of the Chinese Communist Party”. 35 DPRK news covered the Choe bilateral 
meeting with Liu with around five seconds of footage, but the North Korean 
viewing public was not meant to be the audience (it is China).  
 
The Chinese official readout on the bilateral meeting identified Choe as a member 
of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee Politburo, and the Central 
Secretary of the Party.36 Liu Yunshan conveyed to him a certain satisfaction that 
“the Korean Workers’ Party and people have seen the domain of their economy 
and people’s livelihood obtain new heights under the leadership of First Secretary 
Kim Jong-un”.37 After Liu summarized the content of Xi Jinping’s letter to Kim 
Jong-un and received a response, Choe Ryong-hae noted his impressions of China 
as a result of having been invited to the 70th anniversary of victory in the War of 
Anti-Japanese Resistance and the Global Anti-Fascist War. The Chinese release 
quoted him as saying that “I saw and felt for myself the vigorous momentum of 
China’s development” while in Beijing for the September 3 event. Choe then 
“sincerely wished that China will achieve new successes in constructing a 
moderately prosperous society”. Choe proceeded to agree with Liu’s statements 
about the need for calm in relations with South Korea, which would benefit 
“world and regional stability,” noting that “there are no problems we [Koreans] 
cannot solve” and that peace would aid in a more prosperous environment for 
economic development. 
 
There was no explicit mention at all of economic cooperation or cross-border 
security discussions between the two sides, but Choe’s meeting with Liu 
notably consisted of “both sides informing the other of the current internal 
situation” in their respective countries, which would presumably include 
economic matters. If there was a moment during which recent cross-border 
violence was addressed (and there was a People’s Liberation Army representative 
in the room, to be sure), this would have been it.38 
 
A day later on October 11, Liu travelled north to Anju in order to lay a wreath at 
the Chinese Peoples Volunteers cemetery, a traditional site of pilgrimage for CCP 
leaders visiting North Korea (not least as it houses the tomb of Mao Anying, 
Chairman Mao Zedong’s son who was killed in the Korean War) but which is, 
like the bust of Zhou Enlai in Hamhung, resolutely downplayed by the North 
Korean side. Liu’s trip to the cemetery had been prepped by a visit a month prior 
by the PRC Embassy in Pyongyang, and his remarks there, as he said, 
“represented Chairman Xi Jinping” in their gratitude for the work done by North 
Korean colleagues to keep up the site, as well as a similar monument in Kaesong. 
About 200 Chinese were in attendance, ranging from diplomats and Chinese 
investors to overseas students; no North Korean counterparts were listed as 
attending. Not content to recall the Korean War only as a symbol of Sino-North 
Korean comradeship, Liu Yunshan insisted that the sacrifices made by Chinese 
soldiers in Korea should enjoin the living today to “actively promote economic 
development, improving the people’s livelihood, and work together to promote 
the peaceful development of Asia and the world”. The Chinese official 
summary about this section of the trip further mentioned that Liu had at some 
point earlier in his trip made a stop at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, the 
mausoleum of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, to similarly pay his 
respects.  
 
Liu Yunshan’s itinerary for the final day of his journey was not clear, but open 
sources suggest that he had at least one more public meeting with a ranking North 
Korean official, that being Kim Yong-nam. According to the Chinese summary of 
the meeting, Liu told the elderly Korean statesman that “it has been a long time 
between my visits to North Korea, and this time I’ve seen so many 
friendly people and changes, realizing that the successes of North Korean socialist 
construction have been not few, and this makes us truly happy”.39 Liu then added 
that the CCP wanted to see North Korea’s people and government “deepen a path 
of development suitable to this country’s national spirit” under Kim Jong-un’s 
steady leadership. Some discussion of “win-win” development also ensued, along 
with the usual reminders of the need to maintain regular channels of high-level 
communication, push economic and trade cooperation, and strengthen cultural 





To Chinese officials at all levels, the period from 2009, when Wen Jiabao visited 
Pyongyang, to the summer of 2013 must seem like a long-lost halcyon age. 
Having watched Marshal Ri Yong-ho purged and the door to a reformist breeze 
fall ajar in Pyongyang, they will recall that Jang Song-taek, an undisputed North 
Korean heavyweight, was in China in August 2012, giving assurances and signing 
documents to the effect that North Korea was genuinely interested in Chinese 
advice and, more importantly, in reforming its economy at places like 
Hwanggeumpyeong. Indeed, Jang himself almost certainly was interested in such 
things. He is remembered as one of the primary advocates of keeping the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex, a symbol of economic cooperation between the two Koreas. 
It seems no exaggeration to say that what Jang saw in the elevation of Kim Jong-
un was his chance to decisively impact North Korea’s economy.40   
 
Fast forward to the end of August 2013, though, and the two sides lived through 
the bumpiest year in Sino-North Korean relations since 1992, the year China 
normalized relations with South Korea to Pyongyang’s great chagrin. Choe 
Ryong-hae’s visit to Beijing in May 2013 did see the “special envoy” express 
Kim Jong-un’s “support for China’s efforts to restart Six-Party-type talks,” and in 
late July 2013, China sent Li Yuanchao from the CCP Politburo (though not a 
member of the all-powerful Standing Committee) to speak plainly to Kim Jong-un 
at the long negotiating table, but the young North Korean leader decided it was 
best merely to bring an interpreter and Kim Kye-gwan while the negotiating 
aspect of the visit was downplayed in the local press. Moreover, on 25 August 
2013, Pyongyang undertook a propaganda push to further solidify the “Songun 
(military-first) policy” by declaring the “Day of Songun,” which became an 
occasion for Kim Jong-un to offer a long discursive lecture on the great 
importance of his father’s legacy, while noting the justice of the “parallel line” of 
developing nukes and economy simultaneously. This was not music to Chinese 
ears. 
 
Though the two sides reprised a display of unity in Pyongyang in October 2015, 
this hardly served to disguise bilateral problems that are cast into sharp relief 
when looking at events from the economic angle. Where possible the two sides 
willingly work in tandem, as in the case of North Korean labour employed by 
Chinese businesses in Dandong and other border towns and cities, but this has 
become increasingly rare since 2013. 
 
In such a bilateral environment, it is impractical to imagine the OBOR foreign 
policy initiative taking off in this particular corner of Northeast Asia. The idyllic 
bilateral positivity of the Kim-Wen meeting in Pyongyang in October 2009 came 
long before the OBOR initiative was announced, but in truth it may represent the 
21st century high-water mark for bilateral relations between the PRC and DPRK. 
North Korea and China are, for now, travelling on different tracks. 
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